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ADDRESS
THE MEANING OF NUREMBERG*
Henry T. King, Jr."
NUREMBERG WAS A WATERSHED in the development of international
law' - particularly in terms of its effect on concepts of national sover-
eignty.
Pre-Nuremberg concepts of national sovereignty emanated from the
Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the wars of religion between
the Protestant and Catholic states.
The world of the post-Westphalia era was a world in which nation-
states ruled supreme. It was a world filled with armed conflicts between
national sovereigns which brought about death and destruction. It was a
world in which international law, such as it was, imposed no effective
restraints on nation-states and their leaders in starting and carrying out
aggressive wars. It was a world in which there were no restraints on
national leaders in doing as they pleased in their dealings with other
states. It was a world in which individuals had no standing under interna-
tional law to charge nation-states with violations of their rights as human
beings. It was a world in which individuals had no effective obligations
under international law as heads or leaders of nation-states. Individuals in
the pre-Nuremberg world had no obligations to conduct themselves in
such a way as not to injure the citizens of other nations. In short, it was
a world in which international anarchy was the order of the day.
Nuremberg was designed to change the anarchic context in which the
" Remarks of Professor Henry T. King, Jr. of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, at the McLean Lecture, University of Pittsburgh Law School.
B.A., Yale University. L.L.B., Yale University. U.S. Director, Canada/United
States Law Institute; Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; Of Counsel Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. Professor King was
also one of the prosecuting attorneys at Nuremberg.
' The primary Nuremberg trial, carried out by the International Military Tribunal,
was governed by the London Charter of August 8, 1945. This tribunal consisted of
judges from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. The
defendants were leaders in different aspects of German life.
The subsequent proceedings governed by Allied Control Council Law #10 were
carried out by the United States with only U.S. judges on the bench. The defendants
were very important, but they were of lesser rank than those tried by the International
Military Tribunal.
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nations and peoples of the world related to one another. Nuremberg held
that national leaders were responsible for what they did as heads of
nation-states - under international law. It held that individuals had rights
under international law which were not dependent on nation-state recogni-
tion. Nuremberg held that there were enforceable international norms
governing the conduct of armed conflict and that individuals were answer-
able for violating these norms.
Nuremberg was the fountainhead from which initiatives for the
protection of human rights emanated. The European Convention on
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and other similar initiatives are all outgrowths of
Nuremberg.
Nuremberg articulated and enforced the international ground rules
governing the conduct of armed conflict. The inheritance of Nuremberg
is found in the army field manuals of the major nation-states in today's
world. These cover the treatment of civilians and prisoners of war in
wartime. They -provide a working guide for soldiers engaged in armed
conflict. Moreover the Geneva Conventions on 1949 relating to the
protection of victims of war, fill gaps in international military law which
were identified at Nuremberg.
Nuremberg was the first postmortem analysis of the levers of power
in a dictatorship. It showed how power corrupts and the need for a
system of checks and balances to avoid a recurrence the power structure
which had been the earmark of Nazi Germany. We saw the value of a
free press and independent judiciary as restraints on national leaders. We
learned that aggressive wars are more easy to come by where a single
individual, answerable to no one, decides the fate of his nation and other
nations. And we have since learned that, in democracies, the pulse of
democratic opinion is a restraint on national leaders from implementing
dreams of military aggression.
So much for the broad strokes - now to the specifics of the
London Charter which governed the first Nuremberg proceedings before
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) involving Hermann G6ering et
al.
In addition to a conspiracy or common plan count - there were
three basic counts - namely crimes against peace (aggressive war),
crimes against the laws of war (war crimes), and crimes against humanity
(murder and injury to civilians for racial, religious, or political reasons).
The crimes against peace count was based on the Kellogg-Briand
Peace Pact of 1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national
policy and on Germany's violation of the many treaties which committed
her to the peaceful resolution of her disputes with her neighboring states.
The IMT accepted this concept in its decision and found G6ering and his
[Vol. 30:143
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associates guilty of crimes against peace. But the tribunal's holding is
limited to the facts of the case at hand - the Nazi aggression. The
decision lacks sweep and contains little or no language dealing in the
general concept of aggression.
Moreover, the tribunal limited its judgment and findings of guilt in
the crimes against peace count to wars of aggression. Invasions, such as
those of Czechoslovakia and Austria were not found by the IMT to be
crimes against peace on the ground that they were acts of aggression and
not wars of aggression. However, Control Council Law #10, which
governed the subsequent proceedings at Nuremberg after the first case
before the IMT, specifically included invasions in its definition of crimes
against peace.
The Nuremberg holding on war crimes was quite comprehensive.
But, it is a large area in scope, and the primary Nuremberg trial and
subsequent proceedings did not wholly clarify the rules on the taking of
hostages and reprisals. These gaps were corrected by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and, as clarified, have been reflected in the army field
manuals of the major powers.
According to the London Charter of August 8, 1945 and the holding
of the International Military Tribunal, the crimes against humanity could
not stand on its own bottom. These offenses - murder, enslavement, etc.
of civilians for political, religious, or racial reasons to be actionable -
had to be carried out "in connection with or in execution of' another
crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. What this meant was that the
pre-war persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany was not actionable
because it was not connected with a war crime or crime against peace.
But this gap was corrected in Control Council Law #10, which
removed the requirement that crimes against humanity had to be tied to
war crimes or crimes against peace to be actionable. This meant that
Control Council Law #10 encompassed crimes against the Jews in pre-
war Nazi Germany and that such crimes against humanity could stand on
their own bottom. Crimes against humanity, as modified in Control
Council Law #10, did thereupon become the core of the genocide conven-
tion.
The war crimes and crimes against humanity counts at Nuremberg
were the forerunners of the heart of the United Nations Security Council
resolution of May 25, 1993, which provides the basis for the ad hoc
tribunal now sitting at the Hague and trying individuals for crimes
committed during the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia. The Hague
tribunal has no jurisdiction over crimes against peace. To a large extent,
the definition of actionable crimes which guides the Hague tribunal in its
important deliberations follows the International Military Tribunal's
definitions, although one additional crime - that of rape - has been
19981
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added by the Security Council's definition of crimes as set forth in its
resolution. Control Council #10 does specifically list rape as a crime
against humanity, but it seems that no persons were convicted of that
crime in the Subsequent Proceedings. Moreover, the resolution guiding the
Hague tribunal follows Nuremberg in eliminating superior orders as a
defense and also the head-of-state defense.
The primary difference between the Hague and Nuremberg tribunals
is the Hague's requirement that the defendant be in custody to be tried.
Here, in this connection, it will be recalled that Martin Bormann was
tried in absentia at Nuremberg. I have some personal reservations about
this requirement. For example, I think that it would have been better to
have tried Saddam Hussein in absentia rather than not at all. He could
have been given the opportunity to be heard - even by satellite and to
present his case. If he declined, that was his doing and not ours. Suffice
it to say that, if we had tried him, we might have avoided the current
unfortunate situation where he remains a continuing source of trouble for
the U.S. and its allies who fought so hard to contain and repulse his
invasion of Kuwait. There certainly was a great deal of evidence docu-
menting his crimes, and the world should have had an opportunity to see
and assess it. I say emphatically, what did we gain by looking the other
way and turning our back on his personal responsibility for his crimes?
The more we ratify what he did by inaction, the more likely his type of
behavior will be repeated - as it currently is.
The current U.N. initiative for a permanent international criminal
court, which is a direct inheritance of Nuremberg, has been gathering
steam. The deliberations at the U.N. on this initiative are vital to our
long-term future and warrant our close scrutiny. I am confident that my
colleague Ben Ferencz, who has followed and participated in these
deliberations on a day-to-day basis at the U.N., will address them in his
remarks today. Ben deserves a vote of thanks from all of us in this
regard for his persistent efforts on behalf of all mankind.
THE LESSONS OF NUREMBERG
Nuremberg was, for me and, I believe, for the rest of the world, the
most impressive moral advance emanating from World War II.2
2 Historically, it is a matter of supreme irony that we can now equate Nuremberg
with constructive limitations on sovereignty designed to create an assured peace. For it
was less than a decade before the International Military Tribunal convened at
Nuremberg in November 1945, that Nuremberg was the site of the annual Nazi Party
Day rallies where Adolf Hitler whipped up his Nazi stormtroopers into nationalistic
frenzies which foreshadowed the start of World War II. Then, Nuremberg symbolized
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At Nuremberg, we came to grips with the problem that national
sovereignty poses for mankind in our quest for a better and more peace-
ful world. The fact is that unrestricted national sovereignty poses for
mankind in our quest for a better and more peaceful world. The fact is
that unrestricted national sovereignty means, in real terms, international
anarchy. Nuremberg showed us that there must be some limitations on
national sovereignty if we are to have a more secure world.
Nuremberg gave us a blueprint for a better world. Nuremberg
showed us that wanton aggression cannot be permitted if we are to have
a secure world and an assured peace.
Nuremberg showed us that we must reach the behavior of individuals
to create a better world. That we must penetrate the veil of national
sovereignty and punish individuals for violations of international law if
we are to give that law life and vitality.
Nuremberg also taught us that, for a better world, we need to
recognize individuals as having international rights which are not de-
pendent on nation-state recognition.
Albert Speer, in his closing statement at Nuremberg, reminded us
that the march of destructive technology has changed the context in
which nations and individuals must relate to each other. He said that a
"new large-scale war will end with the destruction of human culture and
civilization. Nothing can prevent unconfined engineering and science from
completing the work of destroying human beings which it has begun in
so dreadful a way in this war."
Speer added that, "[tiherefore, this trial [Nuremberg] must contribute
towards preventing such degenerate wars in the future, and towards
establishing rules whereby human beings can live together."
Nuremberg's most important pronouncement was that individuals, and
not merely nations, should be held responsible for violations of the peace
of the world and of human rights. In finding that aggressive war was a
crime, it held that individuals could be punished for their share in starting
such a war. It also held individuals responsible for what they did in the
name of nation-states in violating human rights and the laws of war. The
application of the Nuremberg law meant that no longer could individuals
hide behind the facade of nation-states in committing international crimes.
It meant that these individuals had to come to grips with their guilt and
pay the penalty that society demanded that they pay.3
nationalism run amok. Ten years later, after the most devastating war in human history,
mankind was seeking a better way, and Nuremberg came to symbolize that better way.
' Two other points on the primary Nuremberg judgment are worthy of note. One
is that acting upon the orders of a superior officer was held not to be a defense, even
14719981
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In a nutshell, Nuremberg was, together with the founding of the
United Nations, a seminal legal event in the twentieth century. It provided
the blueprint of a better world - a vision of the future which, some day,
I am confident will be realized.
In Nazi Germany, individuals had surrendered to the external and
mechanical power of the police state. National sovereignty had run wild
under Adolf Hitler. Nuremberg marked the re-affinrmation of the impor-
tance of the individual in the world of nation-states. It held that individu-
als had rights which transcended national boundaries and that individuals
had obligations which were very real and the nation-state afforded no
cover for them in denying their responsibilities.
Nuremberg was right, and it was just. It was a revolutionary break
with the shackles of the past, and it grew out of the conviction that there
was a better way. We saw the stars at Nuremberg and the vision of a
secure world under a rule of law. Let that vision always remain with us,
and let us always keep our eyes on the stars.
where the orders were given by the head of state. Here, the case of the ranking mili-
tary defendant at Nuremberg, Wilhelm Keitel, is a case in point. Keitel's defense at
Nuremberg was that he was ordered to do what he was charged with by Adolf Hitler,
the head of the German state. In finding Keitel guilty, the Nuremberg court ruled that
Hitler's orders afforded no defense for Keitel. Implicitly, a higher law over and above
German law was applicable, and Keitel's guilt was established under that law.
The other defense which the Nuremberg court disposed of was the "head of state"
defense. Under this approach, national sovereignty could not be used to exonerate
leaders for what they did in violation of international law. The court held the line on
this one and said that the test for punishment was whether the actions in question
violated international law, not German domestic law. National leaders could be
complying with German law, but that was not enough - they had to be complying
with international law in their behavior to be vindicated. Since they were not, they
were found guilty at Nuremberg.
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